Bank as a Venture Capitalist by Rishabh, Kumar
Universität Basel 
Peter Merian-Weg 6 





     August 2021 
Bank as a Venture Capitalist 
 WWZ Working Paper 2021/09                Kumar Rishabh 
A publication of the Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), University of Basel.  
 WWZ 2021 and the authors. Reproduction for other purposes than the personal use needs the permission of the authors. 
Bank as a Venture Capitalist
Kumar Rishabh*
Abstract
Banks all over the world show interest in acting as venture capitalists. In this
paper, I argue that banks offer venture capital (VC) financing along with traditional
(collateralized) loans in response to the natural constraints of the hidden information
that they face. Innovative entrepreneurs pursue new technology that promises high
return but runs a high risk of failure. The more innovative entrepreneurs also have
higher reservation utility. This interaction between type-dependent returns and
reservation utility creates a situation where collateral alone is not sufficient to screen
entrepreneurs, and the uninformed bank needs an additional screening device. VC
fulfils that role.
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An economy supports innovation by providing capital to start-ups. A well-functioning market for
entrepreneurial capital requires that financiers overcome several informational frictions. That
is why the market requires specialist investors, such as venture capitalists. Venture capitalists
specialize in screening projects and in providing value-adding services to start-ups. Banks have
always shown interest in pursuing venture capital (VC) financing alongside their core lending
business. However, banks face several regulatory hurdles that limit their participation in VC
financing. In this paper, I argue that in a start-up capital market characterized by hidden
information problem, a bank can efficiently screen borrowers by including both collateralized
credit and VC financing in its offerings.
I present a model of intermediation in which several entrepreneurs face one bank that enjoys
all the bargaining power. Entrepreneurs differ in how innovative they are. The more innovative
entrepreneurs own start-ups (projects) that generate high returns when they are successful.
However, the more innovative projects involve the application of new, untested technology, and
therefore they run a higher risk of failure. More innovative entrepreneurs also have a higher
reservation utility. An entrepreneur’s type is their degree of innovativeness, which is their private
information. There are three different types of entrepreneurs, but they all appear the same to the
bank. I show that when the reservation utility of the entrepreneurs is sufficiently responsive to
innovativeness, there is an incentive for entrepreneurs of the medium type to mimic both the low
and the high types.
In such a scenario, offering only collateralized credit in its menu of contracts does not
help the bank in fully separating the types. Appending this menu with a new contract that
offers value-adding benefits to the entrepreneurs against a high repayment solves the problem of
separation. This new contract is essentially a VC contract. With the extended menu on offer, the
high-innovative types self-select into a VC contract, whereas the low-innovative types self-select
into collateralized credit and the medium-innovation types into uncollateralized credit. As a
corollary, not allowing the bank to offer a VC contract means the bank will have to pool some
types. If the bank is unwilling to pool, it may price out the more innovative types, resulting in an
inefficiently low level of start-up financing.
The novel mechanism in my model that necessitates an additional screening device is that
the preference to mimic is not monotonic. This is a consequence of the interaction between the
type-dependent project returns and the type-dependent reservation utility. To understand this,
consider the benchmark when the bank is informed in the sense that it can observe the type of the
entrepreneur. In this case, to maximize its surplus, the bank would charge a type-specific interest
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rate, such that each entrepreneurial type is just indifferent between borrowing and not borrowing.
If an entrepreneur decides not to borrow, they derive the reservation utility associated with their
type.
Now, note that the return on the project increases with the degree of innovativeness.
Therefore, an informed bank would want to charge a higher interest to more innovative types.
However, more innovative types have higher reservation utility and therefore, to attract them,
the bank needs to sweeten their offer to them. This puts downward pressure on the interest the
informed bank can charge to higher types. These two opposing forces may lead to a situation
where the informed bank charges lower interest not only to the low type but also to the high types
owing to the dominance of the latter force, while the medium type pays the highest interest rate.
If the bank offered the same contracts when the type is unknown, the medium type would have
incentive to imitate both low and the high types as they both pay lower rate than the medium
type.
In this situation, employing collateral alone would not be effective in dissuading the medium
type from imitating the other two types. By introducing a high-collateral-low-interest contract
for the low type of entrepreneur, the bank may be able to deter the medium type from mimicking
the low type. This is because the low types engage in safer projects than the medium types
and, therefore, the low types are relatively more willing to pledge collateral than the medium
type of entrepreneurs, whose projects are riskier. Thus, the bank could devise a contract for
the low types requiring collateral high enough that the medium types would find it unattractive.
However, requiring collateral from high types does not work when the bank attempts to dissuade
the medium types from mimicking the high types. This is because the most innovative types also
have the riskiest projects, and therefore they are relatively less willing to pledge collateral than
the medium types. Thus, any high-collateral-low-interest contract that the bank devises for the
high types, respecting their aversion for collateral, will also be attractive to the medium types.
What would effectively separate the medium types from the high types? The medium types
run safer projects than the highly innovative types, therefore, they are more likely to repay than
the high types. Therefore, medium types are relatively less willing than the high types to pledge a
large repayment in the event of success. How could the bank ask for a large repayment from the
high types without making the contract unattractive for them? They could do this by including in
the contract some “unconditional benefits” for the entrepreneurs. Unconditional benefits refer to
those benefits that the entrepreneur receives regardless of (and possibly before) the realization of
the project outcome. If the bank designs a contract for the high types under which it transfers to
them (in addition to the capital) some value-adding benefits and in return charges them a high
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repayment amount in the case of success, then the medium type would be dissuaded from choosing
that contract. A contract that combines value-adding benefits for the entrepreneurs with a high
repayment requirement is essentially a VC contract.
As evident from the above discussion, in my model, the value-adding investment that yields
unconditional benefits for the entrepreneur is the defining feature of the VC contract. In fact, it
is these benefits that the bank uses as a device to screen the borrowers. A real-life example of
unconditional benefits provided by venture capitalists is the cash compensation for the founder
(Ewens, Nanda and Stanton, 2020; Bengtsson and Hand, 2011). Other examples of benefits include
several mentoring and professionalization services that the VC provides, as well as benefits that
stem from certification or reputation (Hsu, 2004; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Gorman and Sahlman,
1989; Sahlman, 1990).
Contrary to the widely held belief that banks finance only relatively mature firms, the recent
literature has established that banks are also quite active in financing start-ups. However, due to
various restrictions on their private equity activities, banks generally finance start-ups through
the debt market. In an influential study on start-ups in the United States, Robb and Robinson
(2014) find that bank credit is the most prominent form of financing for the newly founded firms.
Given that most start-ups do not have a ready cash flow at the time of borrowing, most of this
borrowing is through the personal collateral of the entrepreneur (Robb and Robinson, 2014; Avery,
Bostic and Samolyk, 1998). The personal collateral is most often the real-estate assets of the
entrepreneur (Schmalz, Sraer and Thesmar, 2017). In fact, many firms in the hi-tech sector have
also begun to pledge their patents as collateral (Hochberg, Serrano and Ziedonis, 2018; Mann,
2018; Kerr and Nanda, 2015; Ibrahim, 2010).
As against the widely held belief that banks finance only relatively mature firms, recent
literature has established that banks are also quite active in financing start-ups. Although, due to
various restrictions on their private-equity activities, banks finance start-ups majorly through
the debt market. In an influential study on start-ups in the USA, Robb and Robinson (2014) find
that bank credit is the most prominent form of financing for the newly founded firms. Given that
most start-ups do not have a ready cash flow at the time of borrowing, most of these borrowing
are through personal collateral of the entrepreneur (Robb and Robinson, 2014; Avery, Bostic
and Samolyk, 1998). The personal collateral mostly takes the form of real-estate assets of the
entrepreneur (Schmalz, Sraer and Thesmar, 2017). In fact, many firms in the hi-tech sectors have
also started to pledge their patents as collateral (Hochberg, Serrano and Ziedonis, 2018; Mann,
2018; Kerr and Nanda, 2015; Ibrahim, 2010).
My results point out that in the start-up capital market, banks should actively participate,
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not only through collateralized debt, but also through VC financing. However, banks’ private
equity activities are highly regulated, and they face restrictions that relate to their involvement
as an equity holder in a venture (Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri, 2007). Consistent with my model
predictions, however, we observe that banks are interested in VC financing as well. This is evident
from the fact that despite several regulatory hurdles, banks have always found ways to carry out
some form of VC financing. For instance, in the United States, before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999 allowed them to engage in various private equity related activities, banks undertook VC
financing by setting up small business investment corporations.1 Again, after the Volcker rule
under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 in the United States, which restricted banks’ participation in
private equity, banks resorted to finding ways around these sanctions (Rothacker, 2013). Perhaps
due to these concerns, US bank regulators eventually eased some provisions of the Volcker rule
that related to banks’ VC investments.2
Most major banks in advanced economies conduct their (restricted) VC activities through
their VC arms.3 Because banks frequently resort to making use of regulatory loopholes to make
indirect VC investments, it is difficult to gauge the precise size of their VC investments. Therefore,
the best we can do is to look at the officially announced investments made directly by banks, for
example, through their VC arms. In studying this data from the Thomson ONE database, we
observe a large cross-regional variation: bank investment accounted for around 6% of the total VC
investment in Western Europe and East Asia, but around 2% percent in North America during
the period 2013-17 (Figure A.1 in Appendix).4 Indeed, recent evidence points out that banks have
become even more active with their VC investments following the boom in fintech start-ups (Barba
and Macheel, 2016; Lorenzetti, 2014).
Literature and contributions: Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2007) put forward an expla-
nation of banks’ foray into the VC market. They propose that making VC investments allows
1See the discussion in Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2007) and Hellmann (1997).
2See the press release on the easing of the Volcker rule (Federal Reserve Board, 2020).
3Citibank with its VC arm, Citi Ventures, and Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group with its VC arm
Mitsubishi UFJ Capital are some examples. In emerging economies as well, banks are becoming increasingly
active in VC financing. For instance, in India and Indonesia, large banks have entered the VC market with
the intent to fund start-ups (Shukla and Vyas, 2016; The Jakarta Post, 2017). In China, the largest banks
were allowed by the China Banking Regulatory Commission to enter VC markets on a pilot basis in 2016
(Mak, 2016). However, Chinese banks had been making VC investments through their offshore investment
affiliates before that as well (Reuters, 2016).
4Other than missing the indirect investments that the banks do in VC due to regulatory reasons,
Thomson ONE also has another shortcoming in that its categorization of investments into different type of
institutions is not perfect (Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri, 2007). An alternative source, for the European
countries, is the annual report of Invest Europe. They report that, of the Euro 7.7 billion raised by VC funds
in 2017, banks contributed around 6% percent (Invest Europe, 2018). For the United States, the National
Venture Capital Association (NVCA) states that this number was 7% in 2011, and in the areas outside of
the traditional VC centers, this share was even larger, for example, it might have been 13% in the upper
Midwest region (NVCA, 2017).
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banks to build relationships with firms that they see as potential future customers of their banking
services. Using data from the United States, Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2007) find that, com-
pared to the start-ups financed by non-banks, start-ups that have banks as a VC investor are more
likely to take a loan from the investor bank at a future date. They also find that although banks
invest more in the early stages of a start-up than in later stages, relative to individual venture
capitalists, banks’ investment is more concentrated in the later stages. The authors then relate
this observation to their hypothesis that banks’ main motive in getting involved in a start-up is to
have a captive borrower base for the future.
In contrast to Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2007), my model predicts that banks will also
be active in the early (seed) stages of a venture, at which time the bank screens different start-ups.
While we do see banks making a major chunk of their VC investment at the seed stage, their lower
activity at the early stage relative to venture capitalists could be driven by regulatory reasons.
For instance, due to fixed costs of regulations, banks may find it remunerative to invest only
large sums of money, which they may prefer to invest only after the start-up has matured and
uncertainties about its value have resolved.
The results of my model imply that allowing banks to make VC investments solves the
adverse selection problem. Therefore, expanding the types of contracts that banks can offer may
increase access to financing for start-ups. With this, I also contribute to the literature that has
studied the normative question of whether a bank should be allowed to make VC investments. To
be clear, this normative question requires studying costs and benefits of deregulating banks’ VC
business along several dimensions. My contribution is to put forward a novel channel through
which the deregulation of banks’ VC investment may achieve benefit. There are other considera-
tions, such as risk-taking issues and relationship benefits, which are not modeled in this paper
but are relevant for this question. Theoretical and empirical papers that discuss the pros and
cons of bank’s equity holdings in start-ups include Von Beschwitz and Foos (2018); Ferreira and
Matos (2012); Berlin, John and Saunders (1996); Santos (1999); John, John and Saunders (1994);
Mahrt-Smith (2006); Boyd, Chang and Smith (1998).
The early literature on VC focused on how entrepreneurs choose between a bank and an
individual venture capitalist. This literature, therefore, highlighted the comparative advantages of
the two kinds of financial institutions. Ueda (2004), for instance, assumes that venture capitalist
and bank differ in their abilities to screen entrepreneurs: a VC can perfectly observe the borrower
type, whereas a bank can do so only imperfectly. However, a venture capitalist poses the threat
that it can expropriate the project from the entrepreneur. In Winton and Yerramilli (2008),
venture capitalists are assumed to have better monitoring capability, but a higher cost of capital
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as compared with banks. In De Bettignies and Brander (2007), bank and VC differ in the extra-
financial support they provide: the venture capitalist actively participates in the entrepreneur’s
business by providing value-adding services, such as managerial inputs, while the bank is only a
passive investor. The venture capitalist’s input directly affects the output of the firm it invests in.
This study derives conditions under which the start-up chooses one kind of financing over the other.
Another paper in this strand of literature is Andrieu and Groh (2012). In this paper, the authors
formulate a model that compares bank-affiliated VC and independent VC. They highlight the
trade-off that these two funding channels offer in a set-up where funding is required over different
periods. An independent VC firm provides better support quality but has limited resources, which
does not guarantee future support for the start-up. A bank-affiliated VC has deep pockets but has
less expertise in providing any other kind of support. The model predicts, among other things,
that firms with less sophisticated ventures would choose bank-affiliated VC.5
My paper differs with the above literature in the following way. In the literature cited
above the focus is on the question of bank versus VC. Therefore, this literature models banks and
venture capitalists as two different sources of institutional finance. My paper, explains why do we
observe one single institution (the bank) offering financing choices, some of which resemble passive
collateralized debt while other resemble active VC investments. In other words, the fundamental
question I ask is the following: why would banks choose to offer VC financing to entrepreneurs
when they also have the option to finance them with debt contracts? Therefore, I do not impose
the types of contracts that the bank can offer exogenously. I endogenize the funding choices that
the bank can use. The bank sees VC as an alternative form of finance to collateralized credit and
includes both the types of financing in its menu of offerings to separate the borrower types.
Another strand of VC literature where banks feature, albeit indirectly, studies the differences
between an independent VC and a corporate owned or a captive VC. A bank-affiliated VC falls
into the latter category. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2008) study the differences in the level
of activism of two types of VCs in terms of their involvement in monitoring and supporting the
portfolio companies. They conclude that captive VCs–including the bank affiliated VCs–showed
less activism in their portfolio companies than the privately held independent VCs. However, the
objective of Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2008) was not to explain why banks would choose to
own a VC arm in the first place.
Another contribution of my study is in terms of the modeling risk-returns relationship. The
existing literature broadly follows two paths when modeling project risk and its relationship to
project returns. Models following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) (henceforth SW) in a classical set-up
5Da Rin, Hellmann and Puri (2013) provide an excellent survey of this literature.
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with one-dimensional heterogeneity assume projects differ only in risk, producing homogeneous
expected returns. Other models allowing projects to differ in their expected returns as well as in
risk, for simplicity, assume these two factors to be perfectly correlated (in contrast, this correlation
is zero in SW by design). Further, the latter kind of model usually assumes that success-state
returns are homogeneous across types. The most prominent studies based on this set-up are
Besanko and Thakor (1987) (henceforth BT) and De Meza and Webb (1987) (henceforth DW). In
Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000), entrepreneurs differ in two privately observed dimensions–both in
risk and in expected returns, with no perfect correlation between the two dimensions.
In my paper, I continue with heterogeneity in both dimensions (risk and expected returns)
with perfect correlation, however, I do not restrict entrepreneurs to producing the same returns
conditional on success. I allow for a more general relationship between risk and expected return
with SW-type no correlation between risk and expected return being one special case. Among other
relations between risk and expected returns, my returns function is also capable of producing
negative correlation between risk and expected returns, i.e., the case of risk-expected returns
trade-off.
Finally, at a more technical level, my study generalizes the result in Besanko and Thakor
(1987) and Lengwiler and Rishabh (2018) that establishes that a monopolist bank does not find
collateral effective for screening borrowers. In this study, I show that when the monopolist bank
faces entrepreneurs with type-dependent returns and type-dependent reservation utilities, we
may find that collateral is not effective, fully effective, or only partially effective as a screening
device. In my set-up, Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Lengwiler and Rishabh (2018) are a special
case in which returns function and reservation utility are constant functions of types. In addition,
I show that when collateral is only partially effective or fully ineffective, the bank can use VC
financing as a tool to solve the adverse selection problem.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I describe the basic elements of the model. In
Section 3, I analyze the full information benchmark with which all other results will be compared.
In Section 4, I discuss the interactions of the uninformed bank with various entrepreneurs. This
section contains the main results of the study, along with some numerical examples. In Section
5, I discuss the alternative assumptions to those that I make in earlier sections. I conclude the
discussion in Section 6.
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2 Model
The economy consists of risk-neutral entrepreneurs and a risk-neutral bank. Each entrepreneur
has a start-up (project) that requires one unit of capital. However, the start-ups do not own any
capital and, therefore, require external financing to run the project. For the bank, the gross
financing cost of capital (which can be thought of as the cost of deposits) is the risk-free rate that I
normalize to be equal to one. The economic activities are organized over two periods. In the first
period, projects are financed, and in the second period, project outcomes are materialized.
Entrepreneurs differ in how innovative they (or their projects) are. We index the en-
trepreneurial types with e ∈ (0,1). The higher the e, the more entrepreneurial (innovative) the
agent is. Entrepreneurial type, e, is information private to the entrepreneur, but the distribution
of e is common knowledge. While bank may easily be able to differentiate an entrepreneur who
plans to run a grocery store from one who requires capital to run a biotechnology firm, it may find
it difficult to distinguish two firms with business plans that involve some futuristic biotechnology
concept. We assume that the bank faces a market of the latter kind, where firms cannot be easily
distinguished from each other based on observable features. Equivalently, the bank does not have
the ability to fully understand the differences in the potential of these projects, making it difficult
for it to distinguish between the entrepreneurial types. An entrepreneur’s type, e, completely
determines the risk-return characteristics of the project they runs as well as their reservation
utility.
2.1 Project returns and risk
We assume a binomial outcome scenario where more innovative entrepreneurs run projects that
promise high returns conditional on being successful but face a higher risk of failure. In the case
of failure, a project produces zero returns. This situation can arise, for example, when the more
innovative projects involve the application of an untested technology. Returns functions with this
property are quite common in the banking literature. For instance, the binomial outcome version
of the returns function in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) has the same property. Other examples include
Karlan and Zinman (2009); Minelli and Modica (2009); De Aghion and Gollier (2000); Ghatak
(2000, 1999); House (2006).
An entrepreneur of type e runs a project that produces zero returns with probability e and
Y (e)> 0 with probability (1− e). That is, the degree of innovativeness (e) is perfectly correlated
with the risk of the project. Therefore, we can also call the entrepreneurial types in our model the
risk types, with higher e representing a higher risk of failure. For the type e entrepreneur, the
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project returns conditional on being successful are given by:
Y (e)= κ−γe
1− e ; with κ≥ 0, κ≥ γ. (1)
The project returns function in 1 can generate several interesting risk-expected returns
relations, including those commonly employed in the existing literature. Figure 1 presents all
such relations that can be generated in the κ–γ plane. In the banking literature, there are broadly
two distinct approaches. In the first—the BT/DW approach—returns conditional on success are
assumed to be constant across all risk types (failure state returns, which are usually assumed
to be zero, are by design the same across all risk types). Therefore, in this approach, the project
returns are ordered in the first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) sense (Besanko and Thakor,
1987; De Meza and Webb, 1987). This specification implies that expected returns decrease with
risk. In Figure 1, the BT/DW type returns functions correspond to κ= γ.
Figure 1: Project returns functions
In the SW approach, expected returns are assumed to be constant across all risk types. All
the projects produce the same expected returns, but the returns of the riskier project are more
widely spread around the mean than the returns of the less risky project. This kind of mean-
preserving spread implies that the returns are ordered in the second-order stochastic dominance
(SOSD) sense (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Minelli and Modica (2009) (henceforth MM) also allows
returns to be ordered in the SOSD sense, but unlike SW, they do not require all the projects to
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produce the same expected returns. In Figure 1, MM return function lies in the region marked
SOSD, which corresponds to the region κ> γ> 0. SW returns function corresponds to γ= 0 and is
special in the sense that it lies at the boundary of returns functions that exhibit SOSD and those
that exhibit no stochastic dominance. It is conceivable that other risk-return relations are possible.
The most notable of these is the risk and expected-returns trade-off. With such a trade-off, there is
no stochastic dominance relationship. In Figure 1, this trade-off is obtained in the region with
γ< 0. Finally, note that κ≥ γ ensures that the conditional return, Y (e), is non-decreasing with the
entrepreneurial type (risk). That means we consider returns functions in the two-colored regions
in Figure 1.
2.2 Type-dependent reservation utility
More innovative entrepreneurs also find better opportunities for themselves if they do not run their
project. This translates into a higher reservation utility for the more innovative entrepreneurs.
More precisely, if an entrepreneur does not implement their risky project, she earns non-
stochastic returns V (e). We consider a type-dependent reservation utility function that is increas-
ing in e.
Assumption 1 Reservation utility function is non-decreasing in e and is quadratic
V (e)= v0 +v1e2 where v0,v1 ≥ 0 (2)
As in the previous case, we can see that reservation utility and entrepreneurial types are
perfectly related. Therefore, we could interpret the entrepreneurial types (and risk types) as the
reservation utility types. It is also interesting to think about the interpretation of the model if,
instead of e, we had expressed entrepreneurial heterogeneity in terms of the reservation utility,
V . In this case, our starting point would be entrepreneurs who differ in terms of their outside
opportunities. For example, entrepreneurs differ in their earning potential from paid employment
in the outside economy (Parker, 2003; Scheuer, 2013). Heterogeneous reservation utility could
also arise because entrepreneurs belong to different job networks (such as university alumni
networks) and enjoy differing levels of support from their networks, such that even for the same
level of ability, people from more connected and supportive job networks get higher-paying jobs.
In any case, having better paid employment opportunities increases the reservation utility of a
prospective entrepreneur and impacts the risk and target return the entrepreneur can choose
when running the project. An entrepreneur with high V would target a high return, Y , offered by
more innovative technology, even if they present a higher risk of failure e. This creates the same
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correlation between e, Y , and V , as we described in the earlier case.
In contrast to our assumption, SW, BT, and DW assume a homogenous reservation utility
(v1 = 0). A type-dependent reservation utility function is used by Freixas and Rochet (2008) and
Sengupta (2014) in their models of the credit market. However, both these studies assume that
the reservation utility function is decreasing in e. The structure of their model is similar to that of
Parker (2003), whose idea is that the higher ability of a person manifests as a higher wage for
them in paid employment and as a lower failure probability if they choose to be an entrepreneur.
This gives a decreasing V (e) function. In all these models, the return function takes the form of
the BT/DW returns function where success state returns (Y ) do not increase in e.
An increasing V (e) function appears to be a more natural assumption with the increasing
Y (e) function. The idea is that the most enterprising type of entrepreneurs are the ones pursuing
innovative but unestablished technologies. These projects offer high returns if successful, but
also have a higher probability of failure. This is a characterization of the technology in industries
that are high-tech driven (for example, information technology, software, biotechnology, and now
also financial services). The quality of the agents that we call entrepreneurial or innovative could
be due to their ability or (for a given ability) the tendency to undertake more rewarding projects
albeit at a higher risk. In other words, more capable entrepreneurs target the high returns that
come with risky technologies. Such entrepreneurs also have a higher reservation utility.6
Our quadratic specification of the V (·) function is a simplification. All the main results in
this paper will hold with many other specifications. We will discuss this in detail in Section 5.
2.3 Collateralized credit and venture capital finance
2.3.1 Collateralized credit
A typical bank credit relation involves a loan of capital by the bank to the entrepreneur against a
contract outlining an interest repayment (R) in the success state, and the amount of collateral (C)
that the bank gets in case the borrower fails and defaults on repayment. There is a dichotomy
in collateral valuation. Bank valuation of the pledged collateral, C, is always βC, with β< 1 to
6Type-dependent utility functions are also common in models that study occupational choice and taxation
in the presence of credit market imperfections. For instance, Ghatak, Morelli and Sjöström (2007) present a
setting with one-dimensional heterogeneity, where high-risk types have lower outside opportunity. However,
consistent with our explanation above, the success output is either constant or decreasing (in different
cases) in risk in their model as well. Scheuer (2013) also allows type-dependent reservation utility in
an occupational choice model with two-dimensional heterogeneity. In his model too, entrepreneurs differ
in both risk and reservation utility, but unlike our model, these two heterogeneities are not necessarily
perfectly correlated in his model. However, in Scheuer (2013), returns are ordered in the FOSD sense,
similar to BT/DW.
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account for the liquidation costs of collateral that the bank incurs when there is a default (Besanko
and Thakor, 1987; Sengupta, 2014; Barro, 1976).
2.3.2 Venture capital finance
An investor-entrepreneur relationship under a VC contract is more involved than the same
relationship through a credit contract. First, under a VC contract, in addition to the capital, the
investor (bank) also provides several other value-adding services to the start-up. Some of these
value-adding investments result in private benefits for the entrepreneur, including sometimes
from outright cash compensation paid by the investor. Second, although securities governing
venture capitalist’s cash flow and control rights may take varied forms in different jurisdictions,
under VC investments generally, the investor exhibits active participation in the venture, for
example, by taking board seats. We discuss each of these in detail below.
A crucial feature of venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship is the value-adding services
that the venture capitalist provides to the venture–the benefits of which are likely to accrue to
the entrepreneur as well (Da Rin, Hellmann and Puri, 2013). These value-adding services may
take several forms: professionalization of the company (Hellmann and Puri, 2002), mentoring of
the entrepreneur, taking board seats, and performing monitoring (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989;
Sahlman, 1990). The entrepreneur and their project may also benefit from the reputation of
the investing venture capitalist through a certification effect and from the existing professional
network of the venture capitalist (Hsu, 2004). While some of these benefits cannot be enforced
and therefore contracted upon, they still play an important role in the contractual relationship
between the two parties. Hsu (2004) finds that venture capitalists of repute acquire start-up
equity at a 10–14% discount.
Another form of private benefit accruing to the entrepreneur from a VC investment is
derived from the cash compensation paid by the venture capitalist (Ewens, Nanda and Stanton,
2020; Bengtsson and Hand, 2011; Wasserman, 2006). According to a study of US ventures by
Ewens, Nanda and Stanton (2020), founder CEOs receive, on average, a cash compensation of USD
100,000/year in the seed stage, with cash compensation rising as the start-up matures. Bengtsson
and Hand (2011) also find that although cash compensation is small in value terms compared with
the implied value of the equity that the entrepreneur holds in the venture, the venture capitalist
provides cash compensation because equity is a noisy and risky kind of compensation.
In what follows, we will denote by B the additional value-adding VC investment. Here
the term value-adding investment is used in a broad sense. For example, it includes the cash
compensation that the VC (bank) commits, and the outlays that the bank makes to offer mentoring
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or professionalization services, and its board activities. The VC investment of amount B has two
effects. First, similar to De Bettignies and Brander (2007), it increases the output conditional on
success by an amount δB, where δ≥ 0. Thus, in the case of success, the total output is Y +δB.
Second, a VC investment of amount B gives the entrepreneur a private benefit of λB, where
λ > 0. This benefit includes the cash compensation and other benefits that may accrue to the
entrepreneur due to mentoring and managerial inputs from the VC.7
VC investment is costly for the bank. The bank incurs a cost φ, with φ> 1, to provide one
unit of VC investment. Note that this cost is higher than the capital cost (fixed at one), as it
includes the additional cost that the bank must incur for its active participation in the venture.
An φ > 1 may also reflect the higher financing cost of VC due to stricter capital requirements
associated with the private equity business of the banks. Indeed, we would assume that a bank’s
engagement in VC business is socially costly in the sense that the cost of VC offered by the bank is
higher than the benefits it brings to the venture and the entrepreneur. That is, φ> λ+δ(1− e)
for all e. What is interesting is that we show that, despite the bank’s VC activity being socially
costly, it may still lead to an improvement in the social welfare (compared to the case when VC
investment by the bank is not permitted) by allowing the bank to serve high-type entrepreneurs.
This assumption is also consistent with the evidence found in the literature that banks are
less effective as a VC investor (Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann, 2008; Andrieu and Groh, 2012;
Cumming and Murtinu, 2016). The results in the literature suggest that banks may face a
higher cost of VC business, and thus undertake that activity only to the extent that it helps them
distinguish between entrepreneurs, as explained by our model.
2.3.3 Securities in VC finance
Another aspect of VC financing is the securities that govern cash flow and control the rights of the
venture capitalist in the venture. Interestingly, there is variation across countries with respect to
which securities are used under VC (Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg, 2007; Cumming, 2005a,b;
Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann, 2009).8 Although equity is a commonly used security, VCs also
7Ours is a static model, while some of the value-adding services that we have talked about are dynamic
in nature. We assume that the entrepreneurs still find them valuable and that these enter their utility
function. One reason for this is that entrepreneurs can use the skills acquired through mentoring and
professionalization in their next venture or upon their return to paid employment following an unsuccessful
venture. A study by Gompers et al. (2010) of VC-backed start-ups in the United States suggests that in the
1990s, almost 10% of start-up founders were serial entrepreneurs, and their ventures performed better than
the ventures of first-time entrepreneurs. Ewens, Nanda and Stanton (2020) and Manso (2016) also find
that, upon returning to paid employment following a failed venture, entrepreneurs do not face any penalty.
8These differences are explained by the tax treatments of capital gains (Gilson and Schizer, 2003) and
legal and institutional set-ups (Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg, 2007). For a review of the literature on
optimal contract within VC financing, see Da Rin, Hellmann and Puri (2013) and Burchardt et al. (2016).
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use other forms of securities, such as convertible preferred equity, that combine debt-like features
with equity-like features.
Instead of mulling over the nuances of the differences in various forms of securities in VC
financing, we prefer to follow a simple approach. We interpret a VC contract as one that involves
the bank providing, in addition to the capital, some value-adding services that also accrue private
benefits to the entrepreneur. In return, the bank may get ‘repaid’ through an equity or debt,
and we leave that interpretation open, as our set-up allows us to capture the complex debt and
equity contracts in a simple way. In the binomial outcome possibility that we have, we need not
write equity contracts explicitly as a share of output and rather express them like any other debt
contracts ex-ante. We can interpret them ex-post based on the repayment conditions that emerge
in the equilibrium (Tirole, 2010, p. 119). An equilibrium contract that requires interest repayment
in the success state and asks for collateral to be put up for the failure state is a standard debt
contract. An equilibrium contract that does not require any collateral payment in the failure state,
but requires only a repayment in the success state, then, can be interpreted as an equity. Therefore,
in this sense, an uncollateralized loan contract can also be interpreted as an equity contract in
our model. In the same vein, an equilibrium contract that requires no collateral and entails a
provision of an additional VC investment—the contract that we will call a VC contract—can also
be interpreted as an equity contract.
However, we will reserve the option of labeling a contract an equity contract only when it
involves a VC investment from the bank. The reason for that is as follows. An equity contract
makes sense only if the exact return is observable to the investor, whereas a debt contract requires
that only the event of success or failure is verifiable by the lender, not necessarily the return. It
would indeed be an unrealistic assumption that, for a small start-up, the exact return be observable
to the outside investor. I will, therefore, assume that while the bank can observe, without cost,
whether a firm has been successful or not, it can observe the success state return only if it has
signed a VC contract with the entrepreneur. This is because the bank as a venture capitalist is
actively engaged in the start-up’s business, and it may actively monitor the start-up by having a
seat on the start-up’s board of directors (Gorman and Sahlman 1989, Kaplan and Strömberg 2004,
Tirole 2010, pp. 90-91). Close monitoring makes the start-up’s cash flow observable to the bank
and any equity contract enforceable.
2.4 Model timing and agent pay-offs
We do not distinguish between a credit contract and a VC contract at the outset. We start from
a possibility that the bank can offer a contract that has elements of both kinds of financing and
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it is determined endogenously whether the chosen contract is a credit contract or a VC contract.
Therefore, we allow the bank to offer contracts that specify an Interest rate (R), Collateral
requirement (C) and VC investment (B). R is the gross repayment that the firm has to make
to the bank in case of success. The bank captures the pledged collateral (C), if the project is
unsuccessful and there is a default. The bank makes the provision of VC investment (B) at the
same time as transferring capital to the borrowing entrepreneur. Indeed, we will see later that it
is an equilibrium outcome that the bank never offers a contract where it requires a collateral (a
characteristic of a bank debt finance) and also makes a VC investment. An equilibrium contract
with B > 0 and C = 0 is a VC contract. As discussed in the previous section, when an entrepreneur
gets a contract with B > 0 the repayment, R, can also be interpreted as gross returns on equity. A
contract with B = 0 and C > 0 is a standard bank debt contract and an equilibrium contract with
B = 0 and C = 0 is an uncollateralized debt contract.
There are two periods, t0 and t1. At t0, the bank offers (possibly a menu of) take-it-or-leave-it
contracts to the entrepreneurs. Contracts are signed (if accepted by the entrepreneur), capital
and additional VC investment are provided in period t0. Consequent on the VC investment, the
entrepreneur draws the private benefit in the period t0 regardless of the outcome of the project.
States and project outcomes realize in period t1. Conditional on the outcome and depend-
ing on the contract signed in t0 firms take action. A successful entrepreneur repays, a failed
entrepreneur may lose collateral if they pledged it under the contract. If an entrepreneur of type e
does not accept any contract then she gets her outside opportunity V (e) in t1. Timing of the model
is summarized in Figure 2.
In order to make capital investment, the bank, collects deposits at t0 and promises to repay
at a gross market risk free interest rate of one to the depositors at t1. To finance VC investment,
the bank raises deposits but also incur additional cost, giving us a cost of VC φ > 1. We also
assume the discount rate is the same as the risk free rate i.e. equal to one.
We assume for simplicity that the entrepreneurs do not have any constraints in putting up
collateral and their ability to put up collateral is the same. For instance, all the entrepreneurs
have the ability to pledge collateral from their wealth in the form of real-estate or even from the
patents they hold. The idea is that bank needs to differentiate between different entrepreneurs
not based on their ability to pledge collateral but based on their willingness. Since, the willingness
to pledge collateral would be smaller for more innovative entrepreneurs as their projects are more
risky, bank can potentially exploit this difference in willingness to elicit information about the
types. To what extent can the bank do that is the issue we deal with in section 4. .
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Figure 2: Model Timing
The social surplus associated with the project of a type e firm is:
S(e)= (1− e)Y (e)−V (e)−1 (3)
The social surplus of type e entrepreneur is the expected return for type e net of that type’s
reservation utility (V (e)) and the opportunity cost of capital, which is one.
For a given contract (R,C,B), the expected profit of a type e firm in excess of the outside
opportunity V (e) is
u(R,C,B; e)=λB+ (1− e) {Y (e)+δB−R}− eC−V (e) (4)
= (1− e) {Y (e)−R}− eC+ {λ+δ(1− e)}B−V (e), (5)
Bank’s expected profit from the same contract can be compactly written as
π(R,C,B; e)= (1− e)R+ eβC−φB−1. (6)
Therefore the surplus generated in the trade with the type e entrepreneur signing the contract
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(R,C,B) is:
u(R,C,B; e)+π(R,C,B; e)= (1− e)Y (e)− (1−β)eC− {φ−λ−δ(1− e)}B−V (e)−1
= S(e)− (1−β)eC− {φ−λ−δ(1− e)}B (7)
From our assumptions that β < 1 and φ > λ+ δ(1− e), equation (7) demonstrates that using
collateral and VC investment entails social loss.
3 The symmetric information benchmark
Since offering collateralized credit and making VC investment leads to social loss, a fully informed
social planner would always choose C(e)= 0= B(e) for all e. Further, to maximize the aggregate
social surplus, a social planner would finance all the projects that have S(e)≥ 0. This is the first
best allocation.
In the case when the bank is fully informed, it will offer type specific contracts such that it
captures the entire surplus from a borrower. Again, since there is a deadweight loss if the bank
offers collateral or VC investment, the bank would choose C(e)= 0 and B(e)= 0 for all e. Therefore
the bank would offer contracts with type specific interest repayment such that u(R(e),0,0; e)= 0.
The full information contracts are therefore given as:
(I(e),0,0) :=
(









Where I(e) is the interest repayment that the type e firm pays in the success state to the fully
informed bank. This says that the symmetric information contracts are uncollateralized debt
contracts.
Since the bank’s profit from a given borrower type now is the same as social surplus from
that type, it chooses to finance all the projects with S(e)≥ 0. Therefore, the fully informed bank
implements the first best allocation.
Assumption 2 We make the following assumption to ensure that I(e) has a unique global maxi-
mum
v1 > κ−γ−v0 > 0
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Let the global maximum is achieved at e∗, where





Thus, contract in (8) shows that with full information, initially with rising innovativenes, e,
interest rate rises but after a certain level of innovativeness (e∗), interest rates fall with higher
e. This happens because the success state return, Y , increases in e giving bank an opportunity
to charge high interest. However, borrowers with high e can also earn higher amount if they
do not run the project (V (e) is increasing in e). So to attract the higher e types to borrow, the
bank also needs to charge smaller interest rate. The interaction of these two forces results in
the inverted U shape of the I(e) function. This is an interesting contrast with more conventional
models like Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Lengwiler and Rishabh (2018) where the less risky
(less innovative) types always pay higher interest rate under full information (i.e. I(e) function is
monotonically decreasing in e). This is a special case in our model. If we assume κ= γ> 0 and
v1 = 0 we get the same I(·) function as in these papers.
4 Asymmetric information
In a more realistic scenario, the bank cannot observe the types and therefore it cannot offer
personalized contracts as above. This information asymmetry gives incentives to the entrepreneurs
to lie about their true types. In what follows we assume that there are three types of agents - low
(e l), medium (em) and high (eh) entrepreneurial types, where 0< e l < em < eh < 1. The share of
the types e l , em and eh are f l , fm and fh respectively where f i > 0 for i ∈ {l,m,h} and
∑
i f i = 1.
For notational convenience we will change the index of types from e to i. That is we denote
S(e i) as Si, V (e i) as Vi, Y (e i) as Yi and so on. We also assume for that all the types are socially
productive, producing positive social surplus.
Assumption 3 Si ≡ S(e i)> 0∀i ∈ {l,m,h}
Given that the I(·) is concave, with three types we can have four possible combinations of
full information interest rate. These are (i) I l ≤ Ih ≤ Im (ii) Ih < I l ≤ Im (iii) I l < Im < Ih and (iv)
Ih < Im < I l . Given es are distinct there can be at most one equality in (i). To keep the analysis
concise, we will focus on only cases (i) and (ii). Once we have dealt with the first two cases, results
for cases (iii) and (iv) will follow easily. We discuss cases (iii) and (iv) in section 5 on alternative
assumptions.
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Assumption 4 Entrepreneurial types, e, are such that either Ih < I l ≤ Im or I l ≤ Ih ≤ Im with at
most one equality.
That is, we assume em is the top type, i.e. agent with highest I(e)) throughout our analysis. We do
not make any assumption about the bottom type (the borrower with lowest I(e)). In what follows
we ignore the possibility of equal Is as it requires us to qualify every exposition every time with
two distinct possible equalities. Since the results with equalities are going to be obvious as we will
see in section 4.1.1, we skip any qualification on that aspect for the rest of the paper.
Now consider what will happen, if the bank offers the full information contracts, as given
in (8), in the presence of asymmetric information. If we have I l < Ih < Im then em and eh types
have incentive to mimic the e l type as it is the e l that is asked to pay the lowest interest rate.
Therefore, all the types will pool at the contract for e l . This will give em and eh informational
rent, u(I l ,0,0; e i) = (1− e i)[I i − I l] > 0, for i = m,h. Clearly bank looses out compared to the full
information case as now it cannot capture the entire surplus from em and eh types. Symmetrically,
e l and em types earn informational rents by pooling at the contract for eh type, if Ih < I l < Im.
The bank will certainly want to do better by possibly separating the types by designing a
self selecting menu of contracts. A menu of contracts would contain the triples, (Ri,Ci,Bi) i.e.
where R, C and B are functions of the entrepreneurial types. To look at the optimal contracts
menu, using the revelation principle, we only need to focus on the menus that give rise to truth
telling (Myerson, 1979). A menu of contracts induces truth telling by ensuring that the contracts
are incentive compatible and satisfy participation constraints (PC) of the agents. An incentive
compatibility constraint, ICi j, requires that the type e i firm finds the contract designed for herself
at least as attractive as the contract designed for any other type, e j. That is:
u(Ri,Ci,Bi; e i)≥ u(R j,C j,B j; e i) ∀i, j ∈ {l,m,h}
Which can be written as,












B j ∀i, j ∈ {l,m,h} (9)
The PC requires that each type prefers to run the project than exercise her outside option.
The bank achieves this by ensuring
u(Ri,Ci,Bi; e i)≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {l,m,h}. (10)
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(1− e i)Ri + e iβCi −φBi −1
]
f i subject to












B j ∀i, j ∈ {l,m,h}
u(Ri,Ci,Bi; e i)≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {l,m,h}
Ri ≤Yi ∀i ∈ {l,m,h}
Ri,Bi,Ci ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {l,m,h}

(P-I)
The first constraint is the set of IC constraints discussed above. There are six such constraints for
the three types. Second is the PC that ensures that the agents find running the project worthwhile
compared to the next best alternatives they have. There are three participation constraints,
one for each type. Next is the constraint requires that, for each type, repayment in the success
state cannot be higher than the income of the entrepreneur. The last set of constraints impose
non-negativity for all the choice variables.
In the following discussion, we will find the conditions under which the bank can separate
the types and solve for the optimal contracts in separation. Afterwards we discuss the equilibrium
outcomes if the complete separation conditions are not met.
4.1 Complete separation
Instead of solving the problem (P-I) we solve a relaxed problem with fewer constraints and show






(1− e i)Ri + e iβCi −φBi −1
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f i subject to






























u(Ri,Ci,Bi; e i)≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {l,m,h}
Ri,Bi,Ci ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {l,m,h}

(P-II)
Problem (P-II) has only two of the six IC constraints viz. ICml and ICmh and contains no viability
constraint as in problem (P-I). Indeed we will ignore this condition for the rest the paper as it
can be checked for em and e l types in any equilibrium this condition is satisfied. In the case of
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eh and when the complete separation is achieved it reduces into a technical condition9, that we
will assume to be satisfied always. Indeed, in all the numerical examples presented later, this
condition is easily satisfied. .
Lemma 1 In any solution to the relaxed problem P-II, the participation constraints for eh and e l
must bind.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there is a solution to P-II in which for some k ∈ {l,h} we have:
u(Rk,Ck,Bk; ek)> 0
⇒ λBk + (1− ek)[Yk +δBk −Rk]− ekCk −Vk := εk > 0
Consider the new contract (Rk,Ck,Bk) such that Rk = Rk +εk/(1− ek), Ck = Ck and Bk = Bk. The
new contract preserves the participation constraint for the type ek, continues to satisfy the two
ICs and does not impact PC for any other types. However, this leads to an unambiguous increase
in profit for the bank. QED
Next, substituting the binding participation constraints for eh and e l in the relaxed problem P-II,
we find the following optimal contracts.
Lemma 2 The solution to the relaxed problem P-II is given by:
Rl = I l −
e l
1− e l
Cl , Cl =
Im − I l
∆ml
, Bl = 0
Rm = Im, Cm = 0, Bm = 0





Bh, Ch = 0, Bh =
Im − Ih
λ∆hm
Where ∆i j :=
e i − e j















and ∆ml > 0, ∆hm > 0.
Proof. See appendix. QED
As a next step, we demonstrate in the appendix, the solution to P-II is also a solution to the
original problem, P-I, by showing that this solution satisfies all the constraints in P-I.
Lemma 3 Solution to P-II is also a solution to P-I.
Proof. See appendix. QED
9The condition is given as δ(1− eh)+λ≤ Vhv1(eh+em−eh em)−(κ−γ−v0) . Essentially it is a condition on the slope
of the participation constraint (indifference curve), relative to its intercept in the R–C–B space.
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Finally, the following proposition summarizes all the results relating to complete separation
including the conditions that ensure that.




(1−β)e l f l
(
1− e l




















the bank separates all the three types offering the contracts:






Im − I l
∆ml
, Bsl = 0
Rsm = Im, Csm = 0, Bsm = 0











Proof. Follows directly from solution to P-II and Lemma 3. QED
The superscript ‘s’ stands for separation.
4.1.1 Discussion of the separating equilibrium
There are some interesting properties of the separating contracts in (11), that we can readily see.
First is that the medium type gets the full information contract i.e. it pays no collateral, gets no
additional VC investment and pays the interest Im. This result is called ‘no distortion at top’, for
em is the top type in our analysis. If the bank offered full information contracts, no type would try
to imitate this type, as under full information em type pays the highest interest rate. It is for this
reason there is no need for the bank to distort the full information contract for em type.
The optimal contracts for eh and e l types are determined by the differences in the sensitivity
of different types towards C and B. The sensitivity is essentially captured by the slope of the
indifference curve. The indifference curve (precisely, three dimensional indifference plane) for any















That is, given any B, the entrepreneur needs to be charged a lower R if a higher C is demanded
while keeping the utility level unchanged (for example, at zero). Further, note this slope itself
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is decreasing in e, making the indifference curve in the C −R plane steeper for higher e. In
other words, marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between R and C, increases with e. Thus, more
entrepreneurial types would be more willing to trade-off collateral for a higher interest rate. This
is because the more entrepreneurial types have riskier projects and, thus, they prefer to avoid
putting up collateral. Equivalently, we can say that types with lower e prefer to take-on more C
for a slight reduction R. Since they are less likely to lose the collateral and more likely to pay up
R, they value a reduction in R a lot even if it means putting up larger C.











1− e > 0
That is, given any C, the entrepreneur needs to be charged a higher R to keep the utility level
unchanged, if a higher B is provided. In addition, this slope itself is increasing in e, making
the indifference curve along B−R dimension steeper for higher e. Thus, more entrepreneurial
types would be more willing to take-on higher interest charges for a unit increase in value-adding
investment. This is because the private benefits from the value adding investments accrue
regardless of the outcome of the project, while R needs to be paid only in successful states. Since
the more entrepreneurial types are less likely to be paying R, due to higher risk of their projects,
they prefer to rather receive these benefits upfront even at a higher R.
The bank exploits these differences in borrowers’ MRS on different dimensions to design an
optimal menu of contracts. For the optimal menu, the bank needs to distort the full information
contract for the types other than the em type, such that no one has any incentive to mimic any one
else (contracts are incentive compatible). As an illustration, suppose, eh is the bottom type. In
other words, eh type has the smallest interest repayment under full information i.e. Ih < I l < Im.
Therefore, e l and em types jeopardize the full information contract of the eh type, by imitating it
under incomplete information, if the bank continues to offer the full information contracts.
How should the bank distort the full information contract for the eh type to prevent em
and e l from mimicking it? Offering collateralized credit (that is necessarily combined with lower
R along the PC) to eh type will not help because the MRS between R and C is increasing in e.
Both em and e l types like contracts with collateral even more than the high type because these
types are more sensitive to R and like any contract that has lower R even with higher collateral
requirement. However, if the eh type gets a contract with VC investment combined with a high
R, the other types will be dissuaded to mimic it, as the other two types succeed (and hence are
required to pay R) with larger probability.
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Now consider the e l type whose contract has to be distorted such that no other type mimics
it. Making any VC investment in the e l type (and charging high interest rate simultaneously)
will not help as relatively more innovative type agent, em will find such a contract even more
attractive since their projects are more likely to fail. While requiring high enough collateral (and
reducing the interest required simultaneously) from e l type might dissuade the other riskier types
from mimicking it, as they are relatively more likely to lose their collateral.
This gives us a clean separation of types into different kinds of contracts. The high en-
trepreneurial types get a VC investment. The bank provides value adding services and in return
gathers a ‘high’ R in the success state and receives nothing in the failure state but. The low
innovative types on the other hand get a standard collateralized credit contract. The middle
types get uncollateralized credit contracts. It is also important to note from the above discussion
that the bank does not offer any hybrid contract involving both collateral and VC investment. In
short, CiBi = 0, ∀i ∈ {l,m,h}. The reason, as discussed above, is that between VC investment (B)
and collateral (C), only one is effective as a screening device for a given type. Finally, note that
although all the types end up at their PCs (PCs of all three types bind), the bank still does not get
the full social surplus because it has to incur deadweight cost of screening.
Figure 3 shows three-dimensional indifference curves associated with u(R,C,B; e)= 0, i.e.
participation constraints – one for each type. By implication of our result that the bank will not
offer any hybrid contract i.e., CiBi = 0, ∀i ∈ {l,m,h}, we can ignore all the contracts in the shaded
part of the indifference curves. We need to focus only on the edges of the indifference curves lying
in the C–R and B–R coordinate planes. These edges are depicted in bold lines in the figure. Indeed,
this can be visualized in a two dimensional figure, making it easier to optically identify the optimal
contracts.
Figure 4 plots C on the horizontal axis starting from origin and moving towards right, and
B on the horizontal axis as well but starting from origin and moving towards left. Essentially in
this figure, the horizontal axis plots two different variables, both taking non-negative values, with
the values increasing farther you are on the axis in any direction.
In addition to the participation constraints drawn in bold lines, the figure 4 also includes the
iso-profit lines (dashed lines) through the benchmark symmetric information contracts. Borrowers
preference increases in the south-west direction, while the bank profits increase northwards.
Clearly, if the bank offered the full information contracts which are depicted on the vertical (R)
axis, medium and the low type would pick the same contract as high type, pooling at the contract
(Ih,0,0), as this contract is south of their own contracts. However, a separating menu is possible
under the conditions C.1 through C.3 in Proposition 1. The three bold points depicted in figure
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Figure 3: Participation Constraints
Figure 4: Participation Constraints and Separating Contracts
4 are the separating contracts. It can be quickly checked that although bank is able to push all
the types to their respective participation constraints, it still earns less profit than the symmetric
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information benchmark, except in the case of the em type, whose full information contract is
not distorted. Note that figures 3 and 4 are drawn for the case Ih < I l < Im. As our solution
shows above, for the alternative case I l < Ih < Im how the conditions that determine the optimal
contracts remain the same.
Let us look at the conditions for complete separation. (C.1) specifies conditions on parame-
ters such as distribution of e, heterogeneity of types and relative cost of screening. The condition
seems quite intuitive: ceteris paribus lower cost of collateralization (1−β) and VC (φ) makes
separation more likely. Also, a higher λ or δ reduce the net cost of VC investment and therefore
make separation more likely. Similarly, other things remaining the same, the more heterogeneous
the entrepreneurs are (i.e. bigger is the difference between e’s) the more likely there will be a
separation of types. Finally, higher the share of the top type ( fm) relative to fh and f l , higher
are the chances that the bank will separate. The reason is that the bank does not have to distort
the contract of the top type and hence there are no profit losses attributable to inefficiency of
the screening process for the em type. Thus, larger the share of em types the more leeway the
bank has on incurring cost of screening for the other two types. If this condition is satisfied with
equality then the bank may give em types some informational rent (allows the PC of em types to
be slack) by allowing some kind of pooling (partial or complete) involving em types with at least
one other types. However, this gives the bank no additional profit. We will assume in such a case
the bank will continue to separate completely such that the PC for em types also binds.
We also require conditions that ensure that by separating the types the bank does not make
negative profits from the types whose full information contracts are distorted. Given the result
from Lemma 1, that the types eh and e l do not earn any informational rent, this condition requires
that the social surplus net of the deadweight loss of using collateral or VC investment should be
non-negative. This is what conditions (C.2) and (C.3) encapsulate.
4.2 Partial and complete pooling
In the case any one of the conditions in proposition (1) is violated, bank will find it profitable to
pool some or all the types. Let us begin by considering the violation of condition (C.1) assuming
the other two conditions are satisfied. We know from the discussion above that bank will not
distort the contract of the top-type (em type). Further, the bank will never find it useful to offer a
collateralized debt contract to high type and a VC contract to low type. Additionally, it is also clear
that any kind of partial pooling will involve the top type (em type), otherwise the bank cannot deter
em type to mimic the other pooled agents. Therefore, the contract on which some or all types pool
must correspond to the full information contract – involving no collateral and no VC investment.
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Since, both collateral and VC contracts incur cost, and at most only one type needs to be separated
in a scenario involving pooling, the bank needs to distort the full information contract of only
that type, at most. Indeed, by the same reasoning, it does not need to distort the full information
contract of any agent in the case of complete pooling.
Who should em type be pooled with? In case of partial pooling, the top two types should
be pooled and the ‘bottom’ type should be separated, for any other combination of pooling of two
agents, will be ineffective in separating the remaining type. In the example of figure 4, under
partial pooling em and e l types will be pooled at the full information contract of e l , while the eh
will be separated with a VC contract, distinct from the one in (11). To elaborate on the previous
points in the context of this example, from figure 4 note, if the eh and e l types are pooled at any
contract, em will mimic them to pick the same contract, since there in no contract where the PC of
both e l and eh types are satisfied and that contract in not to the south of the PC of the em type.
Thus, the two bottom types will pooled only under complete pooling. Further, in this example,
partial pooling of the high and medium type along with separation of low type could not be profit
maximizing as the bank would be spending screening cost of VC financing on two types – em and
eh types rather than only for eh type. Of course, there is also a condition, similar to (C.1) that
needs to be satisfied for the bank to partially pool rather than completely pool the types. The
following propositions sum up the discussion:
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Proof. See appendix. QED
Where the superscript ‘pp’ is for partial pooling.
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the bank pools em and eh types, and separates e l types offering the contracts:
Rpph = R
pp
m = Ih, Cpph = C
pp
m = 0, Bpph = B
pp
m = 0






Ih − I l
∆ml
, Bppl = 0
(13)
Proof. See appendix. QED
Propositions 2 and 3 show that only the bottom type’s contract is distorted. In the first case,
since highly entrepreneurial agents (eh) are the bottom type, they are offered a VC contract while
the other two types are offered an uncollateralized credit contract. In the latter case, smallest
e types are the bottom types and they get the collaterlaized credit contract, while the other two
types get the uncollateralized credit contract. In summary, in a partial pooling equilibrium,
in combination with the uncollaterlized credit contract, either a VC contract is offered or a
collateralized credit contract, but not both.
Another notable feature of optimal contracts under partial pooling is Rppm < Rsm in either
case and Bpph < Bsh in the former case and C
pp
l < Csl in the latter. This is because given that the
bank is pooling the top two types, the amount of distortion required to keep them from mimicking
the bottom type is small.
The conditions (C.4) and (C.5) for partial pooling require that medium types form a relatively
high proportion of the population compared to the bottom type. Additionally, the cost of screening
in either case should be sufficiently low and heterogeneity among entrepreneurs sufficiently high.
The negative terms we see at the end are new in these conditions say that the higher is proportion
of the type with whom the top type is pooled the more likely it is that the bank will partially pool
rather than fully pool. It follows from the fact that larger is the number of these types, the more
surplus the bank can extract potentially by separating them from the bottom type. No surprise
that the violation of condition (C.4) in the first case and of condition (C.5) in the second case leads
to complete pooling.
Proposition 4 If (C.1) is violated while (C.2) and (C.3) are satisfied then
(i) In case Ih < I l < Im holds and (C.4) is violated, the bank pools all the borrower types at the
contract (Ih,0,0).
(ii) In case I l < Ih < Im holds and (C.5) is violated, the bank pools all the borrower types at the
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contract (I l ,0,0).
Proof. See appendix. QED
This proposition says that the bank will pool all the types, should the conditions of separation and
partial pooling are not met, at the first best contract for the bottom type. In this case we will not
observe any VC or collateralised credit.
So far, we have focused only on the violation of condition (C.1) in proposition 1. In case
only this condition is violated but conditions (C.2) and (C.3) are met, we showed the bank will
still serve all the types, although it may not separate them always. However, if either the cost of
venture capital or cost of collaterlization is too high we might see that the bank does not serve
some entrepreneurs and that leads to an additional inefficiency resulting from the shut-down of
the entrepreneurs from the financial market.
4.3 Banning VC activities, shutdown of entrepreneurs and ineffi-
ciency
In this section, rather than completely characterizing all the possible equilibria we will highlight
one extreme example to underline the possibility of inefficient shut down of a type from the market.
We will assume that cost of VC is prohibitively high, such that the bank cannot offer any VC
contract. This can also be thought of as a case when the bank is not permitted to undertake any
VC investment. A parallel analysis could be done by assuming that the cost of collateralization
is prohibitively high (or the entrepreneurs do not have collateral to pledge). In either case there
might be inefficiency due to limited market access: in the first case the eh type might get shut down
and in the second case the e l type. We will focus on the shut down of the former kind. Conditions
for shutdown of e l types when (C.2) is violated can be derived following similar arguments and
are available on request.
In case complete separation is rendered unviable due to high cost of VC, condition (C.3) is
violated for any B > 0. Therefore, with the lack of a screening device at its disposal, the bank
might find it worthwhile sometimes to not serve the eh types.
Take the example of figure 4 again. Here type eh is the bottom type. If condition (C.2) is not
met and even if (C.1) is satisfied, the bank will no longer separate the highly innovative type type.
It is because if it did, it would incur a negative profit on these types. Indeed, in order to serve eh
types, the bank needs to pool them with at least one other type. Therefore, unless the eh types
are close enough to other types or they are present in high numbers relative to other types, they
might not be served.
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Further, note the only pooling involving eh types that is consistent with profit maximization
in this case is where the bank pools all the types i.e., complete pooling. A partial pooling of eh types
with any other type is not incentive compatible. However, note the complete pooling will occur at
the contract (Ih,0,0) and at this contract the bank gives the em and e l types an informational rent.
We can imagine if this joint informational rent turns out to be higher than what the bank gets
by serving the eh types, viz. their social surplus (net of any cost in alternative scenarios), then
the bank will not serve eh types. Thus, an inefficient equilibrium ensues with the high type shut
down from the market. The exact conditions for these are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 5 If Ih < I l < Im, (C.2) is violated for all B > 0 and (C.3) holds then if
fhSh ≥max
{
fm(1− em)(Im − Ih)+ f l(1− e l)(I l − Ih)− (1−β)e l
[
Im − I l
∆ml
]
, [ fm(1− em)+ f l(1− e l)](I l − Ih)
}
The bank pools all the entrepreneurs at (Ih,0,0).
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≤ 1, then the bank shuts down the eh type entrepreneurs and separates
the em and e l type entrepreneurs offering contracts:
Rsdsm = Im, Csdsm = 0, Bsdsm = 0
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> 1, then the bank shuts down the eh type entrepreneurs and pools
the em and e l type entrepreneurs offering the contract:
Rsdpm = Rsdpl = I l , C
sdp
m = Csdpl = 0, B
sdp
m = Bsdpl = 0 (15)
Proof. See appendix. QED
Here, the superscript ′sds′ stands for shutdown with separation and ′sdp′ stands for shutdown
with pooling.
The conditions in the above proposition are intuitive. The first condition has on the left side
the gains from serving the eh types viz. the surplus produced by eh types. The right side contains
the cost of serving the eh types viz. the informational rents the bank gives to the other types when
it pools them. However this cost of serving eh type has to be adjusted with the costs that the bank
incurs in cases when it decides not to serve the eh type. That is the cost corresponding to screening
in ′sds′ and cost of pooling in ′sdp′. Only when the gain by serving eh types is higher than the
net costs in the two cases when eh types are kept out of the market, that the bank chooses to pool
all. In case the bank decides not to serve eh type (i.e. not to pool all the types) it chooses between
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pooling or separating the rest of the types and conditions (i) and (ii) in the Proposition 5 determine
that. The interpretation of conditions in (i) and (ii) is similar to the interpretation of condition
(C.1) in the case of complete separation in Section 4.1.1.
To see diagrammatically, the consequence of prohibitively high cost of VC bank we can refer
to Figure 4 again keeping in mind that no point in B–R plane is achievable any more. Focusing on
the C–R plane, note that collateral alone can not help separate the three types. Why? Starting
from the full information contract for the eh type, denoted by the point Ih, the bank can in no way
distort this contract to dissuade the other types from mimicking it. Any attempt to offer a contract
with more collateral combined with lower interest rate will make the contract even more desirable
to less innovative types with lower failure probability. Therefore, the bank might decide not to
serve the eh types if it finds its profits to be lower when pooling all than serving only the em and
e l types. This would lead to inefficient exclusion of the high types from accessing credit and a loss
in social welfare. No surprise that a similar shut down may occur even when e l is the bottom type.
Consider the same scenario with prohibitively high cost of VC with I l < Ih < Im. The situation,
however, is slightly benign here. Now, the bank finds it harder to exclude the eh types because now
the bank also has the option of involving the eh types in a partial pooling equilibrium – which the
bank didn’t have in the previous case. The following proposition sums up the results for this case:
Proposition 6 If I l < Ih < Im, (C.2) is violated for all B > 0 and (C.3) holds then if
fhSh ≤min
{
[Im − I l](1− em) fm + [Ih − I l]
(
(1− eh) fh −
(1−β) f l e l
∆ml
)
, [Im − Ih]
(
(1− em) fm − (1−β) f l e l
∆ml
)}
The bank shuts down the eh type entrepreneurs and separates the em types with e l types offering
the contracts in (14). If the above condition is not satisfied and
(i). Condition (C.5) holds, then the bank pools eh with em types and separates e l type entrepreneurs
offering contracts in (13)
(ii). (C.5) does not hold then the bank pools all the entrepreneurs at the contract (I l ,0,0).
Proof. See appendix. QED
4.4 Numerical examples
In this section I present a few numerical examples to elaborate on the results in the previous
sections. We first start with understanding the role of heterogeneity and cost of screening in
determining the type of equilibrium. To do that we make some normalizations. First is that for this
section we assume that the heterogeneity across the three types is uniform. That is the parameter,
d := (eh− em)= (em− e l) determines the heterogeneity in the economy. We fix the parameters as in
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the table below for both the examples in this section.









Given these parameters, S(e)> 0, ∀e ≤ 0.78. Therefore, a social planner would finance any
firm with failure probability less than 0.78. Keeping our assumption that all firms are socially
desirable and assuming that em = 0.5, we will, therefore, allow a maximum d equal to 0.27.
Example 1: Separation is viable
In this example we will work in an environment where complete separation is a viable option
for the bank in the sense that conditions C.2 and C.3 hold throughout. The idea is to find which
combinations of φ, β and d give rise to which type of equilibrium – complete separation, partial
pooling, complete pooling. To reduce the dimensionality of the problem in this example, we assume
a symmetric cost of credit and venture capital, so that both types of cost can be represented by one
parameter. We define cost of screening parameter (φn) as the cost of VC which is tied to the cost
of collateral such that φ=φn := 1
β
. This says the higher the cost of collateralization (1−β), the
higher the cost of VC (φ).
Note, given em, each value of d fixes values of e l and eh. Given parameters in table 1, this
gives us symmetric information interest rates, I i ∀i ∈ {l,m,h} and that determines the bottom
and top type. Continuing with our assumption, all our parameters ensure that em is the top
type. Finally, the distribution of types, and the cost of screening parameter φn pins down the
equilibrium and the optimal contracts in the equilibrium.
Assuming uniform distribution of types, figure 5 draws which kind of equilibrium arise
and what type of contracts are offered in that equilibrium. A higher heterogeneity and lower
screening cost support a separating equilibrium. Further, starting from a separating equilibrium,
and holding the cost of screening fixed, as heterogeneity decreases first partial pooling and then
complete pooling emerge as equilibrium. This is so because when the types are closer to each other
they produce surpluses close to each other and it becomes less attractive to separate them as it
incurs a cost. For a given level of heterogeneity and again starting from a separating equilibrium,
33
a higher screening cost first shifts the equilibrium to be partial pooling and then to pooling as the
cost become higher.
Figure 5: Equilibria with varying heterogeneity and cost of screening
Note on the figure: Uniform distribution with f l = fm = fh = 1/3 and I l > Ih
The parameters chosen in this example are such that they give rise to Ih < I l < Im, just like
the way figure 4 is drawn. Therefore, from Proposition 2 we know that in figure 5 under partial
pooling, VC is offered alongside uncollateralized credit. If we had I l < Ih < Im, then according to
Proposition 3, under partial pooling collateralized credit will be offered alongside uncollateralized
credit.
To see the effect of distribution on the possible equilibria, let us deviate from the uniform
distribution and consider a uni-modal distribution with higher proportion of em types. With a
bigger population of em types, as discussed in earlier, the bank has more leeway in separating
the types. Thus, with the distribution skewed towards the em types, the separation region in the
figure 5 should expand at the expense of the partial pooling and complete pooling regions. Figure
6 is drawn with fm = 12 and f l = fh = 14 to demonstrate this.
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Figure 6: Equilibria with varying heterogeneity and cost of screening
Note on the figure: Uni-modal distribution – fm = 12 , f l = fh = 14 and I l > Ih
Example 2: Separation is not viable
Let us now look at an example where cost of separation is too high such that condition (C.2) is not
met and that ensures that the bank will never choose to separate the types.
Suppose conducting VC business for the bank is prohibitively expensive (φ is too large).
As discussed in section 4.3 this can also be thought of as a case where the bank is prohibited
from conducting VC business. Therefore, the bank will serve the high type only when it finds the
conditions optimal for pooling all the types, in other cases it will set the terms of the contracts
such that the high innovative types do not find funding attractive enough to participate. This
entails a loss of welfare, for a socially desirable project is left unfunded.
In a similar exercise to the previous example, we analyze the role of heterogeneity and cost
of screening on equilibrium outcome. However, this time the cost of VC and collateral are not tied
to each other. However, the dimensionality this time is reduced because we do not need to care
about the role of cost of VC, once it is set prohibitively high. So, we analyze the problem with cost
of collateral (1−β) and heterogeneity (d).
We see in figure 7 the bank can shut down the high default probability types for higher
heterogeneity. The intuition is similar to above, that with highly heterogeneous entrepreneurs,
the incentive to separate is higher as the bank can extract surplus from each type. With higher d,
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Figure 7: Equilibria with varying heterogeneity and cost of collateral
Note on the figure: f l = 0.5, fm = 0.3, fh = 0.2, cost of VC is set to be prohibitively high and I l > Ih
eh is higher as well and the surplus it produces is smaller (though positive) and any attempt to
separate it will not be worth given the high cost of VC. Therefore, instead of pooling it with the
others, the bank chooses to not serve the high type. These are the two shut-down regions in the
right. As discussed earlier these regions generate social loss due to exclusion of socially desirable
projects.
5 Alternative assumptions
In this section we discuss the alternative assumptions to the ones made in the previous section.
5.1 If I l < Im < Ih or Ih < Im < I l
Let us start with the violation of assumption 4. Suppose instead of the two possibilities discussed
in section 4 where em is the top type, we have the es such that either I l < Im < Ih or Ih < Im < I l
holds. We can analyse these two scenarios with the graphical tool developed in the previous section.
Using the fact that the bank will never use both VC investment and Collateral in a contract we
can restrict our attention again to the 2-dimensional planes as in figure 4.
Let us consider the case when I l < Im < Ih. The low type is the bottom type and under
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asymmetric information all the other types would mimic it should the bank offer the symmetric
information contracts. How does the bank distort the contract of the e l type to prevent that?
Offering a VC contract will not help as the higher innovative types would prefer such a contract
even more. So, the bank can offer the low type, a collateralized credit, asking it to put up a
collateral and pay a lower interest rate – something that the more innovative types would not find
attractive. However, there is still a threat of eh type selecting the first best contract of the em type.
To address that the bank needs to distort it as well. Again VC contract will not be effective, but
requiring a collateral will still work as the high risk type would prefer not to put up a collateral
(figure 8a).
Figure 8: Contracts when em is not the top type
(a) An example of a ‘credit-only’ equilibria when
I l < Im < Ih
(b) An example of a ‘VC-only’ equilibria when
Ih < Im < I l
Thus we see, in such a scenario no VC contract is offered. Of course whether the bank
ultimately separates all the types or engages in some form of pooling would depend on other
parameters such as heterogeneity and cost of collateral (1−β) but what is true regardless is that
the bank will never offer a VC contract in this scenario.
A symmetric line of arguments in case of Ih < Im < I l , will establish that we will observe
only VC market as collateralized credit will never be effective in sorting the entrepreneurs (figure
8b).
5.2 If κ≤ γ+v0 or γ+v0+v1 ≤ κ
Let us discuss what happens when either of the two inequalities in assumption 2 is not met.
Suppose κ≤ γ+v0, then using (8) we can see I ′(e)< 0,∀e ∈ (0,1). This implies Ih < Im < I l and we
just showed above in such case we shall observe only VC contracts as collateral is not an effective
screening device. This result is related to Lengwiler and Rishabh (2018) where they show for κ= γ
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and v1 = 0 but for any arbitrary type distribution that bank will not find collateral any useful.
Besanko and Thakor (1987) show the same in two type borrower case. Here I show that indeed
collateral will not work as a screening device but the bank can offer VC contracts to make up for
that.
What about when γ+ v0 + v1 ≤ κ? First note I ′(e) = κ−γ−v0 −v1(2e− e
2)
(1− e)2 . Further for
e ∈ (0,1), 0 < 2e− e2 < 1. Therefore if γ+ v0 + v1 ≤ κ then I ′(e) > 0. This implies I l < Im < Ih but
for this case we already showed that collateralzed credit will work but not the VC. Therefore, if
γ+v0 +v1 ≤ κ we will observe only credit contracts and no VC.
This helps us bring the results in section 4 together with the discussion here. We get
three distinct regions as shown in figure 9. In the middle region the possible set of contracts in
equilibrium support bank as a venture capitalist. In the two adjoining regions, the bank has to
take form of a pure credit granting institution or a pure VC. It turns out that the parameter v1
has a significant role in this trifurcation. As v1 becomes larger, the region that supports bank as a
VC expands.
Figure 9: Set of possible equilibrium contracts
5.3 Alternative V functions
This refers to our assumption 1. We already discussed the assumption about increasing V function
in section 4. Here we will talk about the assumption that V is quadratic in e. The idea here is
that when the outside opportunity increases at sufficiently high rate with the type then, under
symmetric information, in order to serve the higher types, eventually the bank will need to lower
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the interest rate it charges on its credit. This creates incentives for the medium types to prefer
symmetric information contracts of both the lower and higher types. Therefore, the bank need to
distort the contracts of the non-medium types in two different directions – one through collateral
and one through VC. Any V function that satisfies this property will generate these incentives and
therefore a co-existence of collateralized credit with VC financing. Our quadratic V function is one
such example. For instance, a cubic or quartic function would also work and in a more extreme
example an exponential V function would also generate these incentives.
In contrast to non-linear V function, a linear V function would generate incentives for the
higher type to mimic the lower types or lower types to mimic the higher types, but never both. As
we showed above that in the former case the bank will employ only collateral and in the latter
case only venture capital to screen entrepreneurs.
6 Conclusion
Banks serve the economy by providing a useful screening service. They screen entrepreneurs,
who possess more information about the prospects of their projects than any other financier does.
In this study, I presented a model of financial intermediation that explains how, to perform its
screening role, banks sometimes (need to) act as a venture capitalist.
I show that when the bank is in a situation in which it cannot effectively separate obser-
vationally identical entrepreneurs with the use of collateral alone, it resorts to VC financing. I
show that this kind of situation may arise when an entrepreneur’s project returns, as well as
their reservation utility, depend on their entrepreneurial type. The model predicts that from the
bank’s menu of contracts, the more entrepreneurial (more innovative) types self-select into the
VC contract, where a VC contract consists of capital and value-adding investments by the bank
against a high repayment in the success state. The less innovative entrepreneurs self-select into
the collateralized credit contract. I also discuss the welfare properties of the optimal contracts. I
show that if the bank’s VC business is prohibited (or is prohibitively costly), then inefficiency due
to restricted market access may ensue, as the bank may decide not to serve all the types.
I develop a novel mechanism that leads to a situation where an intermediate type (medium
type) has the incentive to mimic both the higher and the lower types. This results in a screening
device being only partially effective, requiring another screening device to be introduced in the
menu of contracts. The mechanism rests on the two opposing forces–one that strengthens the
principal’s incentive to demand a higher amount from the agents of higher type, and another that
works to reduce that effect. In my set-up, the former effect arises due to the agent’s (entrepreneur’s)
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success state return being increasing in their type. The latter effect derives from a reservation
utility function that is increasing in type. This general mechanism has potential for application in
other economic contexts as well.
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Appendix A Bank affiliated venture capital investment
Figure A.1: Share of investment by bank affiliated venture capital firms of the total VC
investment in the period 2013-17
Notes on the figure: Data is in percent. Source: Thomson One database on private equity.
Appendix B Proofs
Lemma 2 and solution to P-II
Using Lemma 1 and equation (8) we make the following substitutions for Rl and Rh in P-II:



















Therefore, the Lagrangian for the problem is given by:
L =[Sl − e l(1−β)Cl − {φ−λ−δ(1− e l)}Bl] f l + [(1− em)Rm + emβCm −φBm −1] fm
+ [Sh − eh(1−β)Ch − {φ−λ−δ(1− eh)}Bh] fh
−µ1 [Vm − (1− em)Ym + (1− em)Rm + emCm − {λ+δ(1− em)}Bm]
−µ2
[
















Bm − Ih +∆hmCh −λ∆hmBh
]
Where ∆i j :=
e i − e j















and ∆ml > 0, ∆hm > 0. µ1,µ2,µ3
are the Lagrange multipliers.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
− f l e l(1−β)+µ2∆ml ≤ 0, Cl[− f l e l(1−β)+µ2∆ml]= 0 (B.1)
− fheh(1−β)−µ3∆hm ≤ 0, Ch[− fheh(1−β)−µ3∆hm]= 0 (B.2)
− f l{φ−λ−δ(1− e l)}−µ2λ∆ml ≤ 0, Bl[− f l{φ−λ−δ(1− e l)}−µ2λ∆ml]= 0 (B.3)
− fh{φ−λ−δ(1− eh)}+µ3λ∆hm ≤ 0, Bh[− fh{φ−λ−δ(1− eh)}+µ3λ∆hm]= 0 (B.4)
fmemβ−µ1em −µ2 em1− em
−µ3 em1− em





























fm(1− em)−µ1(1− em)−µ2 −µ3 ≤ 0, Rm[ fm(1− em)−µ1(1− em)−µ2 −µ3]= 0 (B.7)
In addition, the complementary slackness conditions given the constraints in (P-II) are:
µ1 ≥ 0, µ1 [Vm − (1− em)Ym + (1− em)Rm + emCm − {λ+δ(1− em)}Bm]= 0
µ2 ≥ 0, µ2
[






Bm − I l −∆mlCl +λ∆mlBl
]
= 0
µ3 ≥ 0, µ3
[






Bm − Ih +∆hmCh −λ∆hmBh
]
= 0
Starting with (B.3), Suppose Bl > 0, then µ2 = − f l {φ−λ−δ(1−e l )}λ∆ml < 0, a contradiction. Therefore,
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Bl = 0. Similarly, solving (B.2) under the assumption Ch > 0, will lead us to a contradiction
implying that Ch = 0. Note these are true regardless of whether Cl and Bh are non-zero or not.




if Bm > 0 then fmφ= [λ+δ(1− em)]
[









Comparing any two of the three conditions, pairwise, will lead to contradiction implying RmBm = 0,
CmBm = 0 and RmCm = 0. This leaves us with the following possibilities:
(i) Rm = 0, Cm = 0, Bm = 0 (ii) Rm = 0, Cm = 0, Bm > 0 (iii) Rm = 0, Cm > 0, Bm = 0 and (iv) Rm > 0,
Cm = 0, Bm = 0.
Offering (i) and (ii) are irrational and therefore are ruled out. Offering (iii) cannot be profit
maximizing: suppose to the contrary, it is and (iii) satisfies all the constraints but then by reducing
Cm slightly and increasing Rm at the same time such that constraints are still satisfied will lead to
an unambiguous increase in profit. Therefore, the only possibility that remains is Rm > 0, Cm = 0,




Finally, given that Ch = 0 = Bl under the assumption of complete separation bank must
choose positive values of Cl and Bh, otherwise there are not enough devices to screen the en-
trepreneurs. Thus, under complete separation Cl > 0 and Bh > 0, that gives us








Given that 0 < β < 1, φ−λ−δ(1− eh) > 0 and ∆ml ,∆hm > 0 we have µ2 > 0 and µ3 > 0.
Therefore, complementary slackness conditions imply that the ICml and ICmh in (P-II) bind.
Finally to check whether the PCm binds or not, we look at the optimization problem again
with above results. Given that Bm = 0 = Cm, Ch = 0, Bl = 0 and ICmh, ICml , PCl and PCh bind,
the problem simplifies to the bank choosing Rm to maximize
[
Sl − e l(1−β)
Rm − I l
∆ml
]
f l + [(1− em)Rm −1] fm +
[



















Thus, the bank chooses Rm = Im when the above holds. If it does not hold, the bank profit is
decreasing in Rm and then at least one of the above assumptions will not hold. Specifically, then at
least one the two among Bh and Cl will be zero. That will be a case of (partial) pooling. Therefore,
(B.10) also becomes a necessary condition for separation, which can be rearranged and written as
given in (C.1).
We also require conditions that ensure that by separating the types the bank does not make
negative profits on any type. Given the result from Lemma 1 that the types eh and e l non-negative







With these results, the optimal contracts under complete separation are given in the main
text in (11).
Proof of Lemma 3
We show that solution in (11) is also a solution to the original problem, P-I by showing that this
solution satisfies all the remaining constraints in P-I. There are four remaining ICs from P-I
that are to be checked. These are IClm, IChm, IChl and IClh.
Proof.
Solution to P-II already satisfies ICml and ICmh. We consider the remaining four ICs.
IClm and IChm:
Consider a k ∈ {l,h}



































The last step uses the solution to P-II. This implies ICkm is satisfied for k ∈ {l,h} using the
definition in (9).
IChl :
For IChl , we need to consider the two possible cases: Ih < I l and Ih > I l . If Ih < I l then,
Ih < I l
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Since ∆hl > 0 and Cl > 0, the above inequality still holds with the following addition on the right
hand side:
Ih < I l +∆hlCl




































































Bl [using solution to P-II]
This implies IChl . For the case when Ih > I l we have,
I l < Ih
⇒ Ih − I l < Im − I l [since Im > Ih > I l]
⇒ Ih − I l < [Im − I l]
(
eh − e l














[since eh > em > e l]




⇒ Ih < I l +∆hlCl [using solution to P-II]
Now we are back in the second step of proof in the previous case from where we already showed
IChl .
IClh:
Again there are two possible cases. We start with I l < Ih.
I l < Ih
Since ∆hl > 0, λ> 0 and Bh > 0 the above inequality still holds with the following addition on the
right hand side:
I l < Ih +λ∆hlBh
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Bl < Ih +λ∆hlBh +
e l
1− e l

























































Bh [using solution to P-II]
This implies IClh. In the case Ih < I l we have,
Ih < I l
⇒ I l − Ih < Im − Ih [since Im > I l > Ih]
Noting that the function
eh − e
1− e is decreasing in e, we have,
















⇒ I l < Ih +λ∆hlBh [using solution to P-II]
Now rest of the proof follows the same steps as in the previous case, giving us IClh again. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
Following the discussion in section 4.2, BiCi = 0∀i ∈ {l,m,h} will hold. Further, any partial pooling
must involve two top types (i.e. em with one other type). Since the optimal contracts depend upon
who the bank separates, we discuss each case separately.
If Ih < I l < Im, then the bank would pool types em and e l and separate eh types. As we
discussed earlier in order to separate the eh types, distortion should be through a VC contract
that satisfies all the constraints in (P-I).
Proof.
For the pooled types, an undistorted contract that would attract the two top types is the full
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information contract of e l type. Therefore the bank would offer
Rl = Rm = I l , Cl = Cm = 0, Bl = Bm = 0
Clearly this contract, would not be attractive for eh type and therefore satisfies IChm and IChl .
ICmh and IClh, are the ICs that imply distortion in the first best contract of of the eh type. That is
offering a VC contract to eh type. How much should the VC investment be? Enough that ICmh is
satisfied with equality. Keeping in mind Ch = 0 and Bm = Cm = 0, ICmh is:











Bh [since Rm = Im = I l]
Using the PC for eh.












I l − Ih
λ∆hm





Bh. It can be checked this contract will satisfy IClh as well.
Therefore, the bank’s profit under partial pooling is:
πpp = [ f l{(1− e l)I l −1}+ fm{(1− em)I l −1}+ fh{(1− eh)Rh −φBh}]
and can be expressed as:
πpp = f lSl + fmSm − fm(1− em)[Im − I l]+ fhSh − {φ−λ−δ(1− eh)} fh
I l − Ih
λ∆hm
Before finding the condition for partial pooling, let us consider the optimal contracts for
complete pooling. Since Ih < I l < Im, in the complete pooling equilibrium the bank would offer
Rl = Rm = Rh = Ih, Ch = Cm = Cl = 0, Bl = Bm = Bh = 0. Bank’s profit under pooling equilibrium is
πpool = f lSl + fmSm + fhSh − f l(1− e l)[I l − Ih]− fm(1− em)[Im − Ih]



















Proof of Proposition 3
Proof.
For the case I l < Ih < Im, the proof follows the same steps as in the proof of the proposition
2. In this case the top two types – em and eh are pooled. The separated type is the low type. Since,
the bank will not use VC contract to separate the low type, the bank will set Bl = 0. Following the
same steps as above we can show that the optimal contracts are:
Rh = Rm = Ih, Ch = Cm = 0, Bh = Bm = 0
Rl = I l −
e l
1− e l
Cl , Cl =
Ih − I l
∆ml
, Bl = 0
Further, optimal contracts under complete pooling in the case of I l < Ih < Im are given by:





(1−β)e l f l
(
1− e l









Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Follows directly from the proofs of propositions 2 and 3. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Since the only screening device that is effective in screening the eh types is too costly to
be employed if the bank wants to serve the eh types it needs to pool them with at least one other
type. However, eh types cannot be partially pooled with any other type given Ih < I l < Im because
it will not be incentive compatible. Thus, given (C.2) is satisfied, the bank has three options given
Ih < I l < Im (a) pool all the types, (b) shut down eh type and separate the remaining two types and
(c) shut down eh type and pool the remaining types. The conditions that govern which of the three
options is chosen are derived by comparing the profits under the three options.
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Therefore, given Ih < I l < Im, the only equilibrium consistent with profit maximization
where eh is served must be pooling at the contract that just satisfies the PC of the eh types. That
is at (Ih,0,0).
Bank’s profit under pooling equilibrium is
πpool = f lSl + fmSm + fhSh − f l(1− e l)[I l − Ih]− fm(1− em)[Im − Ih]
If the bank instead does not serve the eh types, the contracts that serve the remaining
types should not be attractive to the eh types. Focusing on the remaining types and considering
the separation between em and e l types, the incentive compatible solution can be derived in a
similar manner as in the separation problem (P-I). This will give us the contracts in (14). It can
be checked that these contracts deliver strictly less utility than Vh to the eh types. Bank profit in
this case is given by:
πsds = f lSl + fmSm − f l e l(1−β)
[
Im − I l
∆ml
]
Finally, when the bank shuts down the eh types but pools the remaining types it must involve no
collateral as well. Thus, the only profit maximization consistent contract that serves the purpose
is the full information contract for e l type, i.e., (I l ,0,0). The bank profit in this case is:
πsdp = f lSl + fmSm − fm(1− em)[Im − I l]
Now we know the bank will pool all the type if: πpool ≥ max{πsds,πsdp} and this gives us the first
condition in the proposition. The bank will shut down eh type if the above does not hold. It will in
turn either separate or pool the other types depending upon if πsds ≥πsdp and this gives us the
two other conditions. QED
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Similar to Propositions (3) and (5). QED
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